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Abstract
We describe a new model to simulate the dynamic interactions be-
tween market price and the decisions of two different kind of traders.
They possess spatial mobility allowing to group together to form coali-
tions. Each coalition follows a strategy chosen from a proportional voting
“dominated” by a leader’s decision. The interplay of both kind of agents
gives rise to complex price dynamics that is consistent with the main styl-
ized facts of financial time series.
The present model incorporates many features of other known models and
is meant to be the first step toward the construction of an agent-based
model that uses more realistic markets rules, strategies, and information
structures.
keywords: Financial market, agents-based models, lattice gas, social influ-
ence, collective analysis.
1 Introduction
In recent years many microsimulation models of financial markets are being
developed [1, 2, 3, 4] (see [5, 6, 7, 8, 9] for a review). All these models emphasize
some aspects of the traders and their behaviour. In [3] agents aggregate in
percolation lattices to model the tendency of traders to imitate each other; in
a variant [10] of this model the agents are allowed to diffuse on the lattice
to induce autocorrelation in volatility; in [2] the agents are equipped with a
capital that they reinvest and accumulate while in [1] the authors distinguish
among liquidity and stocks at the current nominal price. Moreover, some models
(the first example is found in [11]) take into account the different tendency to
follow a perceived price for the assets while [12] illustrates different strategies
for value trades some of which are much more realistic than the simple random
buy/sell/inactive choice of [3].
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The present model incorporated many of these features into a single versatile
model. The main goal is to give an easy way to implement different key issues
in modeling the stock market, to understand the relevance and the mutual
influence of certain factors that other models have treated separately, and to
investigate the necessary and sufficient conditions determining the factors which
actually drive the empirical observed facts in real markets.
The word “agents” in the title of this article can be misleading due to the
fact that traders in financial markets are also called agents. Instead we refer to
the idea of agents in the “agent-based models” in the simulation and modeling
paradigm. The modeling and simulation of real systems consisting of agents
that cooperate with each other has emerged as an important field of research.
They are regarded as a consistent paradigm enabling an important step forward
in empirical sciences, technology and theory [13]. To model the dynamics of
a complex system composed of interacting entities with their internal complex
structure and dynamics has many appealing points: self organization strategies
and decentralized control, emergent behaviour, autonomous behaviour, cooper-
ative capacity and aggregation, and spatial mobility.
The purpose of the model hereafter described is to provide a relatively simple
description of the price formation in a stock market. The agents paradigm is
most suited to accomplish this task. Our personal experience in modeling other
complex systems rather than financial markets (in biology and in particular
in immunology [14]) tell us that complex systems need versatile and powerful
methods to be simulated with a certain degree of realism.
This paper is organized as follows: in section 2 we will present the model, in
section 3 we will discuss its dynamics presenting the results of some simulations
and in section 4 we point out some further developments.
2 Model description
In this model we consider two kinds of agents representing what are called
chartists and fundamentalists [11, 15].
The first are traders and speculators whose strategy depends exclusively on
the price history. They are known also as technical traders. For the time being,
we model the chartists as traders who base their decision only on the “current”
value of the price and not on a real historical evaluation of the “trend”.
The other kind of traders, the fundamentalists, consider the “fundamental”
value to determine the “right” price of an asset. To do so we consider an
artificially generated time series as the perceived just price for the traded asset.
Fundamentalists are also called value-traders. Value-strategies are based on
perceived value, that is a model for what something ought to be worth, which not
necessarily corresponds to the actual value. The perceived value is inherently
subjective and at a first approximation it is considered external information.
Basically, value strategies tend to buy when an asset is undervalued and sell
when it is over-valued.
This distinction between the two kind of traders is mostly reflected in the
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different way they decide, at each time step, to buy or to sell a stock. This will
be treated in section 2.1.
Each agent i is represented by some attributes. The order at time t x
(i)
t ∈
{+1, 0,−1}, indicates respectively the decision to buy, to sell or to stay inac-
tive. The capital c
(i)
t of agent i at time t is the current amount of money or
credits. Each agent starts with a certain capital of money with which (s)he can
buy stocks. The decision to buy/sell is then constrained by the availability of
stocks to be sold or funds to buy other stocks. Agents reinvest their profit and
accumulate capital. The number of owned stocks of agent i is indicated by n
(i)
t .
At each time step, the owned stocks account for the actual wealth of the trader
with the current nominal price of the asset pt.
Along with the agents we need to define how an asset is represented in our
artificial stock market, that is, how the price is determined. The current price pt
is computed every time step by a single market maker. While the traders observe
the actual price or the perceived price and submit orders x
(i)
t , the market maker
fills all orders at the new price pt+1 according to a certain increasing function
of the excess demand pt+1 ∝ ζ(pt, Dt) where Dt =
∑
i x
(i)
t denotes the total
excess demand a time t. The form of the function ζ is usually very complicated
and also takes into account exogenous factors (for example the market maker
wants to adjust the price so as to eliminate eventual profit opportunities). For
sake of simplicity we set the new price proportional to the square root of total
supply and demand (as in [16])
∆t = pt+1 − pt ∝ sign(Dt)
√
|Dt| (1)
On the other side, to model the fundamentalist behaviour, we need to define the
perceived value ft of the asset. This include an exogenous source of information
hitting the market, thus ft can be arbitrarily modeled as an exogenous stochastic
process ([11]) with the relative changes drawn from a Gaussian with zero mean
and standard deviation σǫ: log(ft+1) − log(ft) = ǫt where ǫt ∼ N (0, σ2ǫ ). Note
that the fundamental value ft is perceived at the same time and in the same
way by all the fundamentalist traders. In [12] also the case in which there are
diverse perceived values is studied.
At each time step both pt and ft are updated as specified above. In particular
pt is updated with eq(1) where the strategy x
(i)
t for each agent i is determined
by the trading rule described in the next section. The time corresponding to a
single iteration should be thought as the time scale on which the fastest traders
observe and react to price, e.g., a minute to a day. In section 3 we will determine
approximatively the time scale of the model just looking at the outcome of a
simulation.
2.1 Trading strategy
This section describes the logic which rules the trading activity. At each time
step each agent decides, independently from the others, if to buy, to sell or
not to trade. The probability to stay inactive is 1 − α where α is the activity
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parameter as in [3]. In the case they choose to trade, a different decision path
is followed by the two types of traders.
Fundamentalist strategy Fundamentalists tend to follow the “right” price
ft. At each time step the decision to buy or sell proceeds as follows:
(a) If they own stocks then they check if it is appropriate to sell: if pt > ft
then they sell, otherwise they buy another stock. If they cannot buy because
no money is left, then they stay inactive.
(b) In the case they do not own any stock, they check if it is appropriate to
buy, that is, if pt < ft. If pt < ft and if they have enough money, they buy,
otherwise they stay inactive.
Note that this is similar to the “order-based value strategy” in [12] that buys
until prices match values. That strategy is consider unrealistic because it is not
bounded by any risk constraint. In the present rule, instead, the upper/lower
bound is given respectively by the limited amount of capital of the agents and
by the number of stocks they own.
Chartist strategy Chartists follow the market price pt. They are not influ-
enced by any external source of information. At each time step they decide as
follows:
(a) If they own stocks, then they ask if it is appropriate to sell, that is, if the
average price they paid for all the stocks they have bought up to then is lower
than pt. For example if one has invested pt′ + pt′′ (with t
′, t′′ < t) in two
stocks and if pt > (pt′ + pt′′)/2 then selling one of those stock will be a profit
opportunity. If this does not hold and (s)he has money, (s)he will buy another
stock.
(b) In the case they do not own stocks, they simply flip a coin to decide whether
to buy or to do nothing.
Case (b) gives a larger degree of randomness to the behaviour of the chartists.
2.2 Collective formation and diffusion
At this stage of formulation the agents follow independent strategies. Thus,
the excess demand Dt is the sum of independent identically distributed random
variables and for the central limit theorem determines a Gaussian distribution
of the histogram of log-return which is different from what is observed in the
real markets [17].
To obtain a deviation from normality we need to take into account herding
behaviour that has already been demonstrated to determine (at least in part)
the fat tail property of the distribution of returns [3, 10, 18, 19].
Instead of determining a priori the clusters distribution as in percolation models
we just allow the agents to diffuse on the grid and to aggregate inside each single
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lattice site (in [10] self-organized percolation is used to have percolating clusters
without setting the system to the critical point).
To give spatial mobility to the agents we model the market as a lattice
gas. Agents are placed randomly on a regular hexagonal (honeycomb) two-
dimensional lattice L× L (six links at 60◦) with toroidal boundary conditions.
Each site of the lattice may potentially contain all the agents. At each time
step, agents diffuse uniformly to a neighboring site. The diffusion determines a
re-shuffling of agents inside each single lattice site and changes the impact on
the price fluctuations.
Now, the decision of each agent to buy, sell or stay inactive is determined in
two phases: first, each agent makes his choice according to his actual situation
and potential benefit from the activity as specified by the trading strategy in
section 2.1, then, in the second phase, the single agent’s strategy is aggregated
to a simple collective strategy. In this last phase the agent’s decisions x
(i)
t are
weighted by the influence strength s(i) in a kind of proportional vote described
below.
In the spirit of Nowak et al. [20] (see also [18]) the decision of each agent affects
and gets affected by other agents on the basis of its influence strength. The
influence strength of agent i is represented as a real number s(i). If we assign
a much larger influence to some traders among the totality (call them leaders),
the dynamics of the model will be dependent on how many leaders are present.
Leaders are chosen uniformly among the two classes of traders, chartists and
fundamentalists. We represent a group of traders by those agents contained in
same lattice site. So, each group of traders forms a collective system. We also
want a group to be dominated by a leader so that we can set the number of
leaders equal to L2 given that N ≫ L2 where N indicates the total number of
agents.
The influence among agents found in the same lattice site works as follows:
each agent i imposes his/her strategy according to the influence strength s(i).
For each x
(i)
t ∈ {−1, 0,+1} determined by the trading strategy discussed above,
we sum the influence strength of each agent that is following strategy x and we
normalize it to the total so to get values between zero and one to be interpreted
as probabilities (
∑
x pr[x] = 1):
pr[x] =
∑
i:x(i)=x
s(i)/
∑
i
s(i) (2)
where the index i runs over all agents contained in that lattice site. Then we
update agents’ strategy x(i) using a random wheel with probability pr[−1], pr[0]
and pr[+1] given by eq(2).
A collective system arises from the coherent behaviour of a group of strongly
interacting constituents. It also has a weak external coupling. In our case, the
collective can be treated as an individual whose strategy has a distribution of
buy/sell/inactive which is determined by the single agent’s actual strategy x(i)
through eq(2). This means that if exactly one agent is a leader and he has
chosen strategy xˆ then pr[xˆ]≫ pr[x] for the other choices x. Thus, the fraction
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of agents in that collective that will follow strategy xˆ is large. If more than one
leader, say two, is present in the same site and their decision is different, then
they will compete to determine the majority strategy. On average half of the
traders will follow one leader and the other half will follow the other. And so on
for the other possibilities. In general, if we set more than one single leader in
each site (on average), their competition will destroy the effects of the herding
behaviour. This determines, as confirmed by numerical simulations, a Gaussian
distribution of returns.
In conclusion we decide to set on average a single leader (or less) in each lattice
site.
It is worth to note that even in this case the dynamics of each collective group
is equivalent to that of a single agent (the leader) with combined capital. Fol-
lowing this reasoning one would expect a distribution of return with no fat tails
at all. In fact the effect of the collective strategies of the leaders with combined
capital would end up to zero when summed over the whole grid just because
the uniformity of the collectives’ dimension which is about (NC + NF )/L
2 on
average. The results show a clear deviation from a Gaussian instead. Why this
happens? The answer is found considering the synergy between the trading
rule of section 2.1 and the collective formation mechanism described in 2.2; the
collective groups influenced by a fundamentalist leader are coupled (weakly, but
they do) by means of the fundamental price that is perceived by all of them
equally. So, while the chartists’ collectives, being totally uncoordinated, only
produce noise, it happens that fundamentalists’ leaders occasionally end up with
the same decision to buy or sell, driving a large fraction of all the traders to
follow the same decision.
The re-shuffling given by the diffusion of agents can also be interpreted as a
change of preference, in the same way people decide to trust to another brokerage
agency or bank. Moreover, not all lattice sites will contain a leader. In these
“leader free” sites no collective if formed and the behaviour of the agents is
totally independent. Another remarkable mechanism given by the diffusion is
that one agent that leaves a group whose leadership is fundamentalist for a
group whose leadership is chartist will end up in a behaviour’s change much like
the fundamentalist-noisy switch in [11].
3 Discussion
When the number of fundamentalists is higher than that of chartists, the price
pt tracks closely the perceived value ft. This is both trivial and unrealistic.
In fact, evidence from real market data suggests that, while prices track values
over the very long term, large deviations are the rule rather than the exception
[21]. The opposite situation results in too random fluctuations given the random
behaviour of the chartists with the price that does not follows the value.
So, a non trivial dynamics is obtained for NF ≃ NC . In this case we observe
periods in which the price follows the fundamental price followed by periods of
apparently independent fluctuations. For this purpose we set NF = NˆL
2 and
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NC = NˆL
2 for a certain Nˆ . The value of this parameter is found observing that
the collective dynamics depends on its dimension. If the collective systems are
too small we do not get any herding behaviour.
To avoid too large fluctuations of the price around the fundamental price, we
can also get rid of another parameter and set the activity α = 10/(NF +NC).
Figure 1 refers to a simulation with L = 10 and Nˆ = 25 running for 106
time steps. The influence strength of the leader is set to 100 while the remaining
agents have influence strength one. The diffusion speed is set to 10−1. As in
[22] half of the agents start with one stock while the remaining with no stocks.
In this way we obtain a balance between an initial number of people willing to
sell and people willing to buy that would produce an artificial initial bubble or
valley whose amplitude depends on the number of market participants. Besides
it is worth to note that the initial amount of capital each agent is equipped
with, induces the ability of the market price pt to follow the fundamental value
ft when this strongly deviates from the initial value f0. To see this fact just
consider the case in which the agents own little initial capital, then pt is limited
by the global capacity of the agents to buy. On the other hand, the price pt is
-3
-2
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0
1
2
3
4
PtFt
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
0 500 1000 1500 2000
time steps
Vt
Figure 1: Asset price pt and fundamental price ft difference with the initial
value as function of time for the first 2000 time steps of a longer simulation with
2500 agents for each type. In the plot at the bottom is shown the volume Vt
defined as the number of contracts between agents willing to buy and agents
willing to sell.
limited from below by the amount of initial stocks we equip the agents with;
the greater it is, the larger will be a potential fall of the price pt to follow the
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fundamental value ft. These and other related questions will be investigated
elsewhere.
Another consequence coming from the constraint given by the availability
of funds/stocks is that, given the trading rule described above, the activity of
the agents is not uniform. In fact, agents may end up with the decision to stay
inactive either if they want to sell but they do not own stocks or they want to
buy but they do not have money.
Figure 1 shows the price pt to follow the fundamental price ft apart of some
large occasional deviations. The standard deviation of the price is σp = 46 while
σf = 44.94 giving an excess volatility of 2.3%.
In the small chart at the bottom of the same figure we show the traded volume
Vt computed each time step (in contrast to reality where it is computed every
certain period of time, e.g., day or week but not instantaneously). Because
in this model we do not require to match the sell/buy orders, we compute the
volume as Vt =
∑
i |x
(i)
t |. In fact the model does not require that each buy order
should match a sell order because the balance is assured to be made involving a
market maker outside the model itself. The figure shows an increase in volume
when pt ≃ ft because, according to the trading rule, fundamentalists trade
much more in proximity of the fundamental value. This is opposed to periods
in which they either (a) sell all stocks they own because the price is higher than
the perceived value and wait to buy a new stock when the price is lower than
its expected value or (b) they have already invested all the capital and cannot
buy other stocks even if appropriate (see also plots of wealth 2).
Figure 2 bottom panel shows the average wealth per agent computed as the
sum of both liquidity and stocks for the actual nominal price of all agents. The
upper plot shows the average profit per capita and the middle plot the average
number of stocks per capita. It seems that a kind of synchronization exist be-
tween chartists and fundamentalist: when one buys the other sells. This is given
by the balance of the fundamentalists to the escaping force of the chartists. In
fact fundamentalists trade to put the market on track again. In this view the
chartists globally exercise a great indirect influence on the fundamentalists ac-
tions. The same phenomena are observed in LLS’s model [2] taking into account
fundamentalists and trend followers (they call them extrapolating investors).
To better investigate the final distribution of capital we run a large simula-
tion involving two million agents and running for 15000 time steps. In figure 3
is shown the histogram of agent’s wealth-change distribution. It shows a power
law in the central part with slope -1.3 and wide tails. So the central part of the
distribution is consistent with a Pareto-like distribution [23]. It is noticeable the
fact that the initial uniform distribution (all agents start with same capital) is
strongly reshaped over a sufficiently long run (indeed over shorter run the final
distribution of wealth is Gaussian-like, not shown).
This qualitative picture of the model dynamics must be enhanced by a more
quantitative assessment that the model reproduces the features of market price
time series.
Plot 4 shows the histogram of log-return rt = log pt − log pt−1 for the same
8
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Figure 2: The figures show only 104 time steps (on the X-axis) of the much
longer simulation discussed in the text. The upper plot shows the profit per
capita for both type of agents. In the middle the average number of owned
stocks per agent. At the bottom the average total wealth computed as the sum
of liquidity and stocks at the current nominal price pt. The initial value of 300
(euro or arbitrary credits) is given by the initial availability of capital. This plot
shows that both types of agents have very similar patterns of earning. Here, the
chartists are doing better than the fundamentalists.
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Normal. hist. of total wealth change of 2 mil. agents after 15000 time steps
profit
Figure 3: On the X-axis the difference between the final accumulated capital
per agent and the initial capital they are equipped with. A re-shaping from a
uniform distribution (initially they have the same capital) to a power law in the
center of the histogram is observed (Y-scale is logarithmic). The unit for the
X-axis is given in euro or in an arbitrary unit of money.
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simulation of figure 1 and 2. The excess kurtosis of the distribution is 4.58.
Moreover, the histogram has fat tails and power law decay ∝ x−µ in the cen-
tral part leading to exponent µ ∼ 2.8 (see inset plot) roughly consistent with
empirical studies [11, 24].
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1
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1 4
N(0,1)
left tail
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fit of right tail
Figure 4: Histogram of standardized price returns (rt− < rt >)/σrt where
rt = log pt − log pt−1. The excess kurtosis is 4.58. In the log-log inset plot the
fit of the central part of the histogram have slope ∼ 2.8.
Figure 5 show the comparison of the return of the market price pt and those
of the fundamental price ft. The deviation is clear; the exogenous source of
information is transformed into something else by the endogenous dynamics of
the market participant as already demonstrated in [11].
Another relevant property of market price dynamics is the absence of correlation
of return and the persistence of long range correlation of volatility [11, 24].
Volatility of stock price changes is a measure of how much the market is liable
to fluctuate and can be defined in different ways. In the following we define the
volatility as the square of return vt = r
2
t .
Figure 6 shows the autocorrelation function of volatility defined as c(τ) =
[< vtvt+τ > − < vt >2]/[< v2t > − < vt >
2] . Empirical studies show that
the autocorrelation of volatility in real data follows a power law decay with
exponent between 0.1 and 0.3 [25, 26, 27]. Instead we found a slope ∼ .013 that
is one order of magnitude less.
Other empirical studies of large data bases [28] show that the cumulative
distribution of the volatility is consistent with a power-law asymptotic behaviour
characterized by an exponent ∼ 3. Figure 7 shows the histogram of volatility
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Figure 5: Comparing the log return of ft with that of pt. The exogenous source
of information is transformed into something else by the endogenous dynamics
of the market participants. On the X-axis of the upper plot it is reported the
price return while on the two plots at the bottom is reported the time step.
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Figure 6: Autocorrelation function of volatility of return. It shows the corre-
lation of volatility persisting for long time. In the log-log plot the fit has slope
-0.013.
computed for both fundamental ft and actual price pt. In particular a regression
in log-log shows an exponent of -1.67 of the histogram of r2t .
In summary, the model is not yet able to perfectly match some empirical
findings and more work is required.
To obtain a rough estimation of the time scale of the simulated market we
filtered out the time series of return rt from the complete series at intervals of
increasing size ∆t. In figure 8 we show the histogram of the filtered series for
different time lags (this is a slightly simpler procedure than the time-aggregation
used in [11]). A crossover to a Gaussian is observed for ∆t ∼ 60 suggesting that
the time scale of the simulation shown in all figures but fig. 3 is of the order of
half day per time step. Indeed, empirical observations tell that a crossover to a
Gaussian is found on time scales approximatively of one month [17].
There is no doubt that a more rigorous argument would be given estimating
the excess kurtosis of the filtered series and determining the crossover when the
filtered series with a certain ∆t have excess kurtosis about zero. Unfortunately
this would require a huge amount of data points because the kurtosis depends
on the estimation of the fourth moment.
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Figure 7: Log-log plot of the histogram of volatility computed for the random
walk ft and for the price of the asset pt.
4 Conclusions and future developments
We have described a new model to reproduce the price fluctuations of a single
stock in an artificial stock exchange whose traders are modeled as chartists and
fundamentalists. Some of them have more influence than others and represent
a brokerage agency where people go to ask for advice. They group together
inside each lattice site to form a collective system and to follow a common
strategy according to proportional voting. Traders are free to diffuse on a two-
dimensional lattice to model the tendency to change opinion and to follow a
different advisor.
The model is consistent with fat tails of histogram of returns and correlation
of volatility. Nevertheless much work still has to be done to better reproduce
other empirical observed facts as the volatility and wealth distribution.
The structure of the model is versatile enough to allow future expansion some
of which are discussed below. We believe that a more realistic description of the
agents behaviour and trading may allow to get further insight in the dynamics
of price change as well as in the distribution of wealth among traders.
It has been made clear that the availability of capital strongly influences the
dynamics of the model. Thus, a non uniform initial wealth distribution (some
agents represent capitalists or large investors like banks who manage large cap-
itals), may determine the power law of wealth distribution. Besides, agents
should be able to buy/sell more than just one stock at a time according to, for
14
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Figure 8: Each series is vertically shifted to augment visibility. The crossover
to a Gaussian of the histogram of the sub-series of return calculated over a time
scale ∆t = 60 time steps suggests that each time step roughly corresponds to
half trading day in real markets.
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example, the availability of capital and difference between perceived value and
actual price.
Besides it is worth (and the model will easily allow it) to develop more realis-
tic trading strategies like trend-following [12] and/or divide the action among
different choices (more stocks and/or bonds with fixed income as in [2]).
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